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Community-based monitoring instru-ments, such as scorecards, are used increasingly to complement and reinforce conventional mechanisms 
to strengthen accountability and performance 
in public-service delivery. While they have 
been backed by the international community, 
including the World Bank and bilateral donors 
such as the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), there is limited evidence on 
how they work in practice and what conditions 
they need to be effective (Joshi, 2010). Research 
by ODI, funded by Plan UK, seeks to contribute 
evidence through political economy analysis of a 
community scorecard initiative in Malawi. 
Community scorecards in Malawi
Malawi faces significant economic stress and 
on-going political tensions. Despite recent 
impressive year-on-year economic growth, in 
2011 the foreign exchange crisis, combined 
with food and fuel crises, and falling donor 
support, have contributed to a bleak economic 
outlook. This in turn contributes to political ten-
sions, pitting a President set on consolidating 
his power against an increasingly vocal civil 
society that challenges his style of rule. 
Malawi continues to feel the effects of suc-
cessive regimes in which presidents have 
centralised power and distributed patronage 
in ways that influence the allocation of public 
resources. Patchy decentralisation means 
key functions are still overseen centrally and 
resources are allocated according to patronage 
patterns rather than need or implementation 
capacity. As a result, service delivery remains 
highly constrained. In response, a number 
of organisations have introduced community 
scorecard schemes to improve equity and per-
formance in different sectors, the earliest dat-
ing back more than a decade. 
This Project Briefing focuses on a recent initia-
tive (2008-11), the Community-Based Monitoring 
Programme (CBMP). The CBMP is a pilot project 
in eight districts across Malawi’s three main 
regions, led by a consortium of three national civil 
society organisations: Plan Malawi, Action Aid 
Malawi and the Council for Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Malawi (CONGOMA), and the 
Ministry of Development Planning. It is imple-
mented by locally-based partners and has been 
funded by Plan UK and DFID. 
The CBMP uses a facilitated community 
scorecard process through which communities 
can provide feedback on the quality of services 
in a particular sector, as part of a wider process 
of engagement with relevant stakeholders. It 
has a number of stages, including preparatory 
work, implementation, facilitated meetings and 
dissemination of results (Figure 1).
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Key points
• Community scorecard 
approaches that are 
adapted to local realities 
can lead to improved 
service delivery
• They are often presented 
as tools for citizens’ 
empowerment and voice, 
but this can sell these 
initiatives short 
• There are many ways in 
which scorecards can 
support change, including 
through collective problem-
solving and bringing 
together supply and 
demand
Figure 1: Generalised stages of a community scorecard process
Preparatory work 
• Identification and training of facilitating staff 
• Preliminary research on community 
• Introductory engagement with community (e.g. relevant leaders)
Implementation of the community scorecard process 
• Division of community into focus groups 
• Development of performance indicators and scoring by groups 
• Recording and consolidation of scores across groups
Interface and dissemination of results 
• District level interface meetings 
• Feedback and dialogue 
• Development of Joint Action Plans 
• Consolidation of findings across communities and sector/national level engagement
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Our research finds that the CBMP has the poten-
tial to contribute to positive changes in service 
delivery, and that it has started to do so in different 
sectors. This matters, given the unfavourable con-
text in Malawi.
Field visits highlighted improvements linked to 
the CBMP, including the construction of new facili-
ties in schools, such as housing for teachers or new 
classrooms. New rules were being applied on the 
use of materials and equipment, such as ensur-
ing that procured textbooks are put into circula-
tion. There were examples of School Management 
Committees with renewed understanding of their 
roles and responsibilities. In agriculture, CBMP-
linked contributions include the creation or modifi-
cation of oversight mechanisms, such as taskforces 
to monitor the distribution of agricultural subsidies 
or Market Committees determining new policies to 
manage markets to reduce illicit behaviour and cor-
ruption.
More than just demand?
The CBMP has been framed as a mechanism to 
strengthen citizens’ demand and voice in relation to 
service providers and other state duty-bearers. Its 
vision of change links citizens’ empowerment and 
accountability and improved service delivery. This is 
in line with prevalent thinking about social account-
ability and service delivery – the World Bank’s 2004 
World Development Report, for example, called for 
stronger accountability relationships between serv-
ice users and providers to improve outcomes (WDR, 
2004). 
However, framing such initiatives solely as 
mechanisms to strengthen the ‘voice’ with which 
citizens demand services from duty-bearers (the 
‘supply-side’) may sell them short, underestimating 
the range of mechanisms that can generate changes 
in service-delivery practices.
This wider perspective is particularly important 
as the assumed link between citizen empowerment 
and improved service delivery may not correspond 
to local incentives and power dynamics. In Malawi, 
local level service delivery is shaped by a range of 
patronage relationships and the centrality of the 
Presidency. In practice, incentives of service provid-
ers are more focused on responding to signals from 
the centre than from citizens. Even actors seen as 
rooted within communities – such as traditional 
authorities and village chiefs – are under increasing 
pressure to respond to the imperatives of the ruling 
party. In sectors such as agriculture, they are also 
gatekeepers who determine the selection and allo-
cation of fertiliser coupons. 
Where there are pressures from below, they will 
not necessarily lead to improved public services. 
Many people, understandably, prioritise benefits 
for themselves, their families or immediate commu-
nities, rather than the provision of public goods and 
allocation of resources based on need. They can get 
these benefits through patronage relationships, 
while promises of broad-based provision of public 
goods on the part of politicians are rarely seen as 
credible. This prevalence of patron-client relation-
ships (Box 1) shapes the nature of accountability in 
multiple sectors. 
This supports the findings of multi-country evalu-
ation studies and research: that achievements in 
increasing citizens’ voice and accountability do not 
necessarily lead to better service delivery (Rocha 
Menocal and Sharma, 2009; CFS, 2010). Service-
delivery improvements involve enhanced respon-
siveness to users’ concerns and needs, but this 
requires strong top-down performance pressures 
and upward accountability of providers to govern-
ment leaders as well as downward accountability. 
User demand rarely works on its own (Booth, 2011). 
This does not mean that there is no link between 
citizens, downward accountability and service- 
delivery outcomes, but the roles of these actors and 
the form of their relationships cannot be taken as 
a given. A broader view is needed, grounded in a 
realistic model of citizen-state relations, to capture 
the spectrum of possible change. This can reveal a 
range of routes to achieve improvements in access 
to and quality of public services, including more 
incremental or intermediate improvements that may 
be possible without significant changes in citizen-
state relations.
Routes to improved service delivery
Our Malawi research suggest a multiplicity of pos-
sible routes to improvements in service delivery 
to which a scorecards initiative might contribute, 
including options for intermediate steps. While we 
have drawn on the Malawian context to identify 
these routes, they may be relevant across other set-
Box 1: Key concepts
Patron-client relationships: A powerful actor (a 
patron) allocates goods or services to an individual 
or a sub-set of the population (a client) in exchange 
for their support. This contrasts with public goods, 
which benefit everyone and cannot be withheld on 
the basis of individual favour.
Principal-agent relationships: One actor (the 
principal) relies on and must motivate another 
actor (the agent) to act on their behalf. Principals 
must signal their interests and priorities to agents, 
and may find it hard to monitor that agents’ 
performance (information asymmetry problem). 
Collective action problems: When the broader 
context and incentives stop actors producing 
something of value together, that they could not 
produce alone (Ostrom et al., 2001). These can 
reflect problems of motivation, free riding, or 
information asymmetries/imperfections.
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tings. However, not every route will be appropriate 
for all contexts. 
As Figure 2 shows, community scorecards could 
influence service delivery through at least six chan-
nels, only one of which is strengthening citizen 
demand.
Route 1: Greater responsiveness to citizen 
demands for public goods. This entails a step-
change in the relationship between citizens and the 
state, a transition to new behaviour whereby duty-
bearers see providing public goods and services as 
the best way to remain in power. The scope for this 
type of change, however, particularly within the lim-
ited timeframe of most programming cycles, is lim-
ited in Malawi. This is not surprising – fundamental 
shifts in citizen-state relations take decades if not 
centuries and often happen incrementally. Major 
changes in citizens’ voice and empowerment and 
greater responsiveness will require wider structural 
changes, beyond the CBMP.
Route 2: Increased resourcing and services within 
existing patronage networks. This involves no fun-
damental shift in incentives but rather an increase 
in funds overall, with a knock-on increase in total 
funds for service delivery. Actions leading to this 
mechanism could include more (ring-fenced) donor 
funding that does not displace government funds. 
This would not, however, address all the blockages 
that lead to poor service delivery in Malawi.
Route 3: Improving the flow of information 
between citizens/service users and decision-mak-
ers. This helps overcome one type of information 
asymmetry that arises in principal-agent situations 
(Box 1) by providing better information to decision-
makers on citizen’s priorities or to citizens on what 
to expect from service providers. Again, this may 
not change the fundamental relationship between 
citizens and the state or the incentives of actors. 
Improvements may be possible, however, through 
better information for technocrats able to work 
within existing constraints to improve performance, 
and for politicians with incentives to improve the 
delivery of goods and services to reinforce patron-
age networks. It may also mean improved aware-
ness of citizens on how to access services. 
Route 4: Greater top-down performance pressure. 
This involves systemic changes to enforce sanctions 
on poor performance and reward good perform-
ance. It requires political leadership with a strong 
developmental vision, and bureaucratic incentives 
to deliver services effectively. Such change can be 
systemic, driven by key leaders at the national level 
and reaching downward, or more localised, with 
local leaders creating islands of effectiveness. These 
leaders may be politicians, officials or traditional 
leaders such as chiefs – but they must be motivated 
by performance issues. Where such local leaders 
exist in Malawi, community scorecards can play a 
complementary role as a performance measure for 
top-down processes.
Route 5: Collective action by communities to 
directly provide service-delivery inputs. In some 
cases, service delivery appears to be constrained 
by a problem in collective action, whereby no action 
is taken to address a problem because the costs 
per individual are seen as too high and the ben-
efits too diffuse (Box 1). While there are tasks (e.g. 
moulding of bricks, some school construction) to 
which communities can contribute using available 
resources and labour, individual households may 
be reluctant to participate because of a free-rider 
problem. Solutions exist where there are leaders 
who can enforce participation and follow up where 
tasks have not been carried out. Some examples of 
change achieved by the CBMP took this form, and 
seemed to be most effective where they could tap 
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into historical legacies of ‘community self help’.
Route 6: Collective action encompassing the 
supply and demand sides. In some cases, collec-
tive action on the part of a single actor group (e.g. 
community members) may be the most effective way 
forward. In others, overcoming key service-delivery 
bottlenecks may require action by a wider range of 
actors. Some examples of change for the CBMP high-
light the importance of bringing together ‘coalitions’ 
of actors, including district officials, service providers, 
police, traditional chiefs and community groups to 
develop Joint Action Plans and collective responses 
to service-delivery gaps. The potential importance 
of coalition-building suggests that conventional 
divisions between ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ 
interventions, which assume an adversarial relation-
ship among the actors, are less helpful than a focus 
on collective forms of problem-solving.
Implications for policy and practice 
Our research finds that community scorecards dem-
onstrate the potential to result in improved service 
delivery, and there are already examples of change 
being realised by the CBMP. Framing such initiatives 
only as mechanisms to strengthen citizens’ voice 
and demand, however, can sell them short, under-
estimating the range of mechanisms through which 
they can impact on service-delivery performance. 
This range offers a number of feasible mechanisms 
to improve access to, and the quality of, public serv-
ices in the short term without requiring a paradigm 
shift in citizen-state relations (although this can 
remain a long-term goal).
The effectiveness of a scorecards initiative 
appears to depend on a number of local conditions 
including the characteristics of implementing civil 
society organisations and of the local community. 
The quality of local leadership is also particularly 
important for the delivery of public goods (Cammack 
and Kanyongolo, 2010). 
In Malawi, the scorecards initiative seems to work 
particularly well where it has facilitated collabora-
tive spaces or forms of collective problem-solving 
by actors across the supply and demand side. The 
provision of information (to citizens or to service 
providers) is one element, but more important is the 
process to identify the key stakeholders and bring 
them together to devise Joint Action Plans. 
Refocusing on options for collaboration may 
also identify greater entry points to address more 
systemic change. Initiatives like scorecards can 
find it challenging to scale up or to address service-
delivery problems that require action above the 
local level (for example, by a sector ministry or the 
government). It is key to understand where more 
systemic changes are needed, and identify opportu-
nities to feed into national level processes and work 
with national actors.  
Where the CBMP initiative has worked well, it has 
reignited community capacity for self help. In this 
way, it is an important reminder of the responsibili-
ties and powers of citizens themselves.
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